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Abstract
The establishment of a peacekeeping force is widely accepted to be an essential part of any
future Israeli-Palestinian peace accord. The final status settlement proposed by the Clinton Admin-
istration specified “[s]security arrangements that would be built around an international presence.”
However, while the need for a peacekeeping force appears to enjoy broad support, it should be
noted that the ”Road Map” proposed by the European Union, Russia, the United Nations, and
the United States (together ”the Quartet”) in 2003 does not suggest the inclusion of peacekeeping
forces, although it does envisage a monitoring mechanism for its interim phases. The authors set
out to examine, from an Israeli perspective, the feasibility of establishing a form of multinational
peacekeeping force as part of a future Israeli-Palestinian peace accord. Part I of this Article as-
sesses past successes and failures of peacekeeping missions in and around Israel. Part II discusses
the reasons for the success and failure of those past peacekeeping missions. Part III identifies best
and worst case scenarios when implementing peacekeeping missions. The Article concludes by
suggesting that bilateral security cooperation with multinational oversight may be a better way of
dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict than peacekeeping missions.
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PEACEKEEPERS: WILL THEY ADVANCE ANY 
PROSPECTIVE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE 
AGREEMENT? 
Justus Reid Weiner, Avinoam Sharon & Michelle Morrison* 
INTRODUCTION 
The establishment of a peacekeeping force is widely 
accepted to be an essential part of any future Israeli-Palestinian 
peace accord. The final status settlement proposed by the 
Clinton Administration specified “[s]ecurity arrangements that 
would be built around an international presence.”1 In discussing 
the issue of security, American diplomat Dennis Ross, who was 
one of the American negotiators of the 1995 Interim Agreement 
on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the 1997 Protocol 
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1. DENNIS ROSS, THE MISSING PEACE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE FIGHT FOR MIDDLE 
EAST PEACE 3 (2004). 
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Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, and who served as 
President Clinton’s Middle East coordinator, wrote: “[T]he key 
lies in an international presence that can only be withdrawn by 
the agreement of both sides.”2 
Among the most prominent non-governmental initiatives 
recommending the inclusion of peacekeeping forces are the 
Geneva Accord3 and the Bipartisan Statement on US-Middle East 
Peacemaking, entitled “A Last Chance for a Two-State Israel-
Palestine Agreement” (“Bipartisan Statement”), drafted and 
signed by ten former senior US government officials and 
presented to the administration of US President Barack Obama.4 
Although the need for a peacekeeping force appears to 
enjoy broad support, it should be noted that the “Road Map”5 
proposed by the European Union, Russia, the United Nations, 
and the United States (together “the Quartet”) in 2003 does not 
suggest the inclusion of peacekeeping forces, although it does 
envisage a monitoring mechanism for its interim phases. 
Similarly, the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative does not include any 
mention of peacekeeping forces.6 Tellingly, however, former US 
National Security Advisors Brent Snowcroft and Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, both of whom were among the authors of the 
Bipartisan Statement, have pointed out the need for 
 
2. Id. at 802. 
3. The Geneva Accord was launched on December 1, 2003. The Accord sets out a 
Draft Permanent Status Agreement and a Model Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement. As 
part of the proposed peace accord to be signed between a future Palestinian State and 
the State of Israel, the Geneva Accord envisages the establishment of a multinational 
force, which would form an “integral part of the Implementation and Verification 
Group.” The Geneva Initiative, The Geneva Accord: A Model Israeli-Palestinian Peace 
Agreement (Dec. 2003), available at http://www.geneva-accord.org/mainmenu/summary. 
The stated purpose of the Multinational Force under the terms of the draft Peace 
Agreement is “to provide security guarantees to the parties, act as a deterrent, and 
oversee the implementation of the relevant provisions of this Agreement.” Id. 
4. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI ET AL., U.S./MIDDLE EAST PROJECT, A LAST CHANCE FOR A 
TWO-STATE ISRAEL-PALESTINE AGREEMENT, http://www.usmep.us/bipartisan_ 
recommendations/ A_Last_Chance_for_a_Two-State_Israel-Palestine_Agreement.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 25, 2010). Among its various recommendations and vision for a future 
peace between Israel and a future Palestinian state, the Bipartisan Statement envisages 
the establishment of a multinational force: “a coalition peacekeeping structure under 
UN mandate featuring American leadership of a NATO force supplemented by 
Jordanians, Egyptians, and Israelis.” Id. at 14. 
5. The Roadmap: Full Text, BBC NEWS, Apr. 30, 2003, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2989783.stm. 
6. The Council of Arab States, The Arab Peace Initiative (2002), available at 
http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/peace02.htm. 
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supplementing the initiative with a multinational peacekeeping 
force.7 
It is against this background that the authors set out to 
examine, from an Israeli perspective, the feasibility of 
establishing a form of multinational peacekeeping force as part 
of a future Israeli-Palestinian peace accord. Part I of this Article 
assesses past successes and failures of peacekeeping missions in 
and around Israel. Part II discusses the reasons for the success 
and failure of those past peacekeeping missions. Part III 
identifies best and worst case scenarios when implementing 
peacekeeping missions. The Article concludes by suggesting that 
bilateral security cooperation with multinational oversight may 
be a better way of dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
than peacekeeping missions. 
I. ASSESSING THE SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF 
PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS IN ISRAEL AND ALONG HER 
BORDERS 
A. What is “Peacekeeping”? 
Before addressing the subject of peacekeeping and its place 
in a future Arab-Israeli peace accord, it is useful to define what is 
meant by the term “peacekeeping.” Peacekeeping is one of the 
stated objectives of the United Nations. Article 1 of the United 
Nations Charter declares among the United Nations’ purposes: 
To maintain international peace and security, and to that 
end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention 
and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression 
of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to 
bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or 
settlement of international disputes or situations which 
might lead to a breach of the peace.8 
This would appear to define peacekeeping in broad terms 
that include negotiation and adjudication as well as active, 
 
7. Brent Snowcroft & Zbigniew Brzezinski, Middle East Priorities for Jan. 21, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 21, 2008, at A23.  
8. U.N. Charter art. 1. 
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coercive intervention. However, as Professor Erik Suy has 
explained: 
The peacekeeping system foreseen in the UN Charter has 
not been realized. Instead, another concept or system has 
been created and developed through the practice of the 
organization: the UN peacekeeping operations, which can be 
defined as actions involving the use of military personnel in 
situations of international armed conflict on the basis of the 
consent of all parties concerned and without resort to armed 
force except for self-defense. The main difference from the 
originally planned system is that these operations cannot be 
considered as enforcement actions.9 
The distinction between peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement has also been made by the International Court of 
Justice.10 The fundamental view that peacekeeping is based upon 
consent and that peacekeepers may employ force only in self-
defense was reiterated in August 2000 in the Report of the Panel 
on United Nations Peace Operations (“Brahimi Report,” also 
commonly described as the “NYU Report”),11 which 
recommended that “consent of the local parties, impartiality and 
the use of force only in self-defense should remain the bedrock 
principles of peacekeeping.”12 This view was adopted among the 
“Basic Principles” of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: 
Principles and Guidelines (“Capstone Doctrine”).13 Thus, while 
peacekeeping forces often employ military personnel, and 
although peacekeeping troops have been armed since the 
deployment of the United Nations Truce Supervision 
Organization (“UNTSO”) in Sinai in 1957, it should be borne in 
mind that they are supplied only with defensive weapons to be 
used solely for their own protection.14 
 
9. Erik Suy, United Nations Peacekeeping System, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1143, 1143 (Peter Macalister-Smith ed., 2000). 
10. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the 
Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 163–72 (July 20). 
11.  Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, U.N. Doc. 
A/55/305, S/2000/809; U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., (Aug. 21, 2000) [hereinafter Brahimi 
Report]. 
12. Id. at ix. 
13. UN Dep’t of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations: Principles and Guidelines (2008), available at http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/
Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf [hereinafter Capstone Doctrine]. 
14. Suy, supra note 9, at 1146. 
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In addition to United Nations peacekeeping operations, 
peacekeeping is also carried out by multinational forces acting 
with the consent of the parties outside of the United Nations 
framework. For example, the Multinational Force in Sinai 
(“MFO”) was established in 1982 to supervise Israel’s withdrawal 
from the Sinai Peninsula. 
Thus, “peacekeeping” is concerned with military or other 
personnel engaged in observation, interposition, and 
maintaining law and order within a state.15 The first type of 
“peacekeeping,” observation, refers to the supervision of 
compliance with the terms of an agreement between the parties 
to a conflict, e.g., in the Arab-Israeli context, the United Nations 
Truce Supervision Organization established in 1948, the United 
Nations Disengagement Observer Force (“UNDOF”) established 
in 1974, the Multinational Force in Sinai established in 1982, the 
Multinational Force in Lebanon (“MNF”) established in 1982, 
and the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (“TIPH 
I”), a civilian observer force established in 1994 and reinstated in 
1996 (“TIPH II”).  
Interposition refers to situations where peacekeepers act as a 
separation between the parties to a conflict, as in the case of the 
United Nations Emergency Force (“UNEF”) established in 1957, 
and UNEF II, established in 1973. A third type of force, often 
grouped under the rubric of “peacekeeping” but not falling 
within the strict definition of observation and interposition, is 
that of military personnel engaged in maintaining internal law 
and order within a state, e.g., the United Nations Interim Force 
for Southern Lebanon (“UNIFIL”) established in 1978, and the 
Multinational Force in Lebanon established in September 1982 
following the withdrawal of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (“PLO”) from Beirut and the assassination of 
Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel. 
With this basic understanding of the nature and role of 
peacekeeping forces, the Article now proceeds to examine and 
evaluate the performance of the various missions deployed in the 
context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
 
15. See Derek W. Bowett, International Military Force, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1267, 1268 (Peter Macalister-Smith ed., 1995). 
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B. Tools for Assessing Success or Failure of a Peacekeeping Mission 
In many cases, the determination of the overall success or 
failure of a peacekeeping operation seems obvious—the most 
extreme case, of course, being the outbreak of war or hostilities 
despite the presence of an active peacekeeping operation. 
However, a more structured approach than mere intuition is 
preferable in analyzing the success, failure, or partial success or 
failure of a peacekeeping operation. As American diplomat and 
scholar Professor Dennis Jett notes, there is disagreement among 
various experts in defining the factors by which to judge the 
success or failure of a peacekeeping mission.16 Jett cites four 
criteria, proposed by Canadian Professor Duane Bratt, for 
assessing the success or failure of a peacekeeping mission: 
“completion of the mandate, facilitation of conflict resolution, 
containment of the conflict, and limitation of casualties.”17 This 
seems to expand upon the proposal by Professor Paul Diehl that 
peacekeeping operations be evaluated in accordance with their 
performance on two criteria: the limitation of armed conflict and 
conflict resolution.18 
C. United Nations Peacekeeping Missions deployed in the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict 
1. United Nations Truce Supervision Organization  
UNTSO was established by UN Security Council Resolution 
50 on May 29, 194819 in order to assist the UN Mediator and 
Truce Commission supervise the truce between Israel and the 
Arab forces that invaded her following Israel’s declaration of 
independence.20 However, the truce lasted only four weeks, and 
fighting again erupted.21 An indefinite ceasefire was ordered by 
Resolution 54 on July 15, 1948, and a second group of UNTSO 
military observers was deployed with each of the Arab armies and 
the Israeli Defense Forces, with each Israeli armed group, in 
 
16. DENNIS C. JETT, WHY PEACEKEEPING FAILS 19 (1999). 
17. Id. (citing Duane Bratt, Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations, INT’L 
PEACEKEEPING, Winter 1996, at 64). 
18. PAUL F. DIEHL, INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING 34 (1993). 
19. See S.C. Res. 50, U.N. Doc. S/RES/50 (May 29, 1948). 
20. Milos Struger, The UNTSO Story, 35 U.N. CHRON., Sept. 1998, at 43. 
21. Id. 
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Jerusalem, along the coast, and in the various ports and airports 
within the area of the truce. In 1949, following the signing of the 
four General Armistice Agreements between Israel and Egypt, 
Israel and Jordan, Israel and Lebanon, and Israel and Syria, 
UNTSO’s mandate was extended to supervise these agreements.22 
Currently, the mandate of UNTSO is “to monitor ceasefires, 
supervise armistice agreements, prevent isolated incidents from 
escalating and assist other United Nations peacekeeping 
operations in the region.”23 
Since the commencement of its operation in 1948, UNTSO 
has maintained a presence in the Middle East, including being 
attached to the various additional peacekeeping forces that have 
been deployed over time, such as the United Nations 
Disengagement Observer Force (“UNDOF”)24 and the United 
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.25 Currently, the force consists 
of 151 military observers supported by 88 international civilian 
personnel and 123 local civilian staff. It has its headquarters in 
Jerusalem. The international personnel of UNTSO are drawn 
from Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, 
China, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Russian Federation, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.26 
Overall, UNTSO has succeeded in its declared purposes of 
monitoring ceasefires, supervising armistice agreements, and 
assisting other UN peacekeeping operations in the region.27 
However, UNTSO has been less successful in carrying out its 
mission of preventing isolated incidents from escalating. The 
clashes between Egyptian outposts and Israeli patrols along the 
 
22. Id. 
23. UNTSO Mandate, http://untso.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1201 (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2010). 
24. See infra Part I.C.4. 
25. See infra Part I.C.5; About UNTSO, http:// untso.unmissions.org/ 
Default.aspx?tabid=1204 (last visited Oct. 17, 2010); see also Robert Satloff & Rachel 
Stroumsa, A UN ‘Protection’ Force for Palestinians: Background and Implications, WASH. INST. 
FOR NEAR E. POL’Y, Nov. 17, 2000, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/
templateC05.php?CID=1987. 
26. UNTSO Facts and Figures, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/
untso/facts.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2010). 
27. See Rosalyn Higgins, The June War: The United Nations and Legal Background, 3 J. 
OF CONTEMP. HIST. 253, 255–57 (1968) (discussing the successes and failures of 
UNTSO). 
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Sinai border in the early 1950s and the incursions into Israel by 
Egyptian trained fedayeen (Palestinian terrorist militias) during 
that period are among the examples that demonstrate this lack of 
success. Following the Suez Crisis, the ensuing Sinai Campaign in 
October 1956 further emphasized the inability of UNTSO to 
prevent war. Indeed, due to UNTSO’s ineffectiveness, following 
the Sinai Campaign, Israel declared its unwillingness to 
cooperate further with UNTSO.28 This set the stage for the 
establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force. In 
addition to the shortcomings of UNTSO on the Egyptian-Israeli 
front, it should also be noted that, as the former President of the 
International Court of Justice Rosalyn Higgins observed, “the 
operation of the Mixed Armistice Commission machinery had, in 
the case of the Jordan-Israel and Syria-Israel Agreements, become 
very unsatisfactory.”29 
2. United Nations Emergency Force I (“UNEF I”) 
In an effort to secure an end to the Suez Crisis, then 
Canadian Minister of External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, 
proposed a plan that led to the establishment of the UNEF.30 
Deployed on November 15, 1956, UNEF can be said to be the 
first real “peacekeeping” force, as that term is conceptualized 
today. Among the main features that characterized this new UN 
force were: (1) leadership: the force was directed by UN 
Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, and fell under the field 
command of a neutral officer appointed by the head of the UN 
executive; (2) composition: country contributors to the force 
were not from any major powers; (3) neutrality: it was intended 
that the force be neutral as to both its purpose and its actions; 
and (4) positioning: the force was intended to be positioned 
between the parties to the conflict, acting as a sort of physical 
barrier between the warring parties.31 
 
28. Id. at 259–60. 
29. Id. at 260. UNTSO is the UN observer force of the Mixed Armistice 
Commissions established under the General Armistice Agreements between Israel and 
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Id. at 254. 
30. DIEHL, supra note 18, at 31; see also G.A. Res. 1000 (ES-I), U.N. GAOR, 1st 
Emergency Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/3354, at 2–3 (Nov. 5, 1956). 
31. See DIEHL, supra note 18, at 31; UNEF I Background, http://www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/missions/past/unef1backgr2.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2010) (discussing 
the establishment of UNEF). 
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The mandate of UNEF I was to “secure and supervise the 
cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal of the armed 
forces of France, Israel, and the United Kingdom from Egyptian 
territory and, after the withdrawal, to serve as a buffer between 
the Egyptian and Israeli forces and to provide impartial 
supervision of the ceasefire.”32 To enforce this mandate, the 
force consisted of between 6073 military personnel supported by 
international and local civilian staff at its maximum, and 3378 
military personnel supported by international and local civilian 
staff at the time of its withdrawal in May 1967. The force was 
headquartered in Gaza and its international troops were drawn 
from Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, 
Indonesia, Norway, Sweden, and Yugoslavia.33 
UNEF I did succeed in securing and supervising the 
cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the various armed 
forces as set out in its mandate, but unfortunately, the inherent 
conditions of its mandate made it impossible for UNEF I to keep 
the peace. As Professor N.D. White wrote: 
Despite proposals that UNEF I should guarantee passage 
through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, UNEF’s 
mandate and functions were to derive from the General 
Assembly’s resolutions which basically called for four things: 
a cease fire, the cessation of hostilities, abstention from 
military raids and incursions, and scrupulous observance of 
the armistice agreements.34 
Additionally, in accordance with the guiding principles 
presented by the Secretary General to the UN General Assembly, 
UNEF I was deployed entirely on Egyptian territory with the 
consent of the Egyptian government.35 As a result, UNEF had no 
power to guarantee free passage through the Suez Canal or the 
Gulf of Aqaba, and as a guest on Egyptian territory, UNEF had 
no choice but to withdraw when Egypt ordered it to leave in May 
1967.36 
 
32. UNEF I – Mandate, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/
unef1mandate.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2010). 
33. UNEF I – Facts and Figures, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/
past/unef1facts.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2010). 
34. N.D. WHITE, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL 
PEACE AND SECURITY 193 (1990); see also Higgins, supra note 27, at 261. 
35. UNEF I Background, supra note 31. 
36. Id. 
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While some opinions have been expressed questioning 
whether the UN Secretary General had no choice but to order 
UNEF’s withdrawal,37 White has pointed out that if UNEF had 
remained, its continued presence would have been hostile and its 
function would have become one of peace enforcement rather 
than of peacekeeping.38 Regardless of the historical merits of the 
debate, the Capstone Doctrine now states: “[I]n the absence of 
such consent [of the main parties], a United Nations 
peacekeeping operation risks becoming a party to the conflict; 
and being drawn towards enforcement action, and away from its 
intrinsic role of keeping the peace.”39 
In assessing the shortcomings of UNEF I, it is worth 
recalling Suy’s definition of peacekeeping as “actions involving 
the use of military personnel in situations of international armed 
conflict on the basis of the consent of all parties concerned and without 
resort to armed force except for self-defense”40 and noting 
White’s observation that “Egypt’s consent to UNEF I is illustrative 
of the basis of all observer and peacekeeping functions. It also 
demonstrates their weakness.”41 
3. UNEF II 
UNEF II was established on October 25, 1973, and was 
tasked with supervising the implementation of the ceasefire 
between Egyptian and Israeli forces following the Yom Kippur 
War.42 Further, UNEF II was charged with using its best efforts to 
prevent a recurrence of the fighting and to cooperate with the 
International Committee of the Red Cross in its humanitarian 
missions in the area.43 UNEF II enjoyed the support and 
cooperation of UNTSO.44 While UNEF II’s mandate remained 
unchanged throughout its deployment, its activities evolved and 
were adapted in accordance with the changing role dictated by 
 
37. See Higgins, supra note 27, at 262; see also WHITE, supra note 34, at 193. 
38. WHITE, supra note 34, at 193. 
39. Capstone Doctrine, supra note 13, at 32. 
40. Suy, supra note 9, at 1443(emphasis added). 
41. WHITE, supra note 34, at 193. 
42. S.C. Res. 340, ¶ 3, U.N. SCOR, 28th Sess., U.N. Doc S/11046/Rev.1 (Nov. 25, 
1973); see also UNEF II Mandate, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/
unef2mandate.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2010). 
43. See UNEF II Mandate, supra note 42; see also DIEHL, supra note 18, at 48. 
44. See UNEF II Mandate, supra note 42. 
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the peace negotiations between Egypt and Israel that ultimately 
led to the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty signed on March 26, 1979.45 
The signing of the peace treaty heralded the end of the mission 
of UNEF II, but it remained in the region until July 24, 1979.46 
Clearly, UNEF II was successful in carrying out its mandated 
mission.47 While the presence of UNEF II was not the direct 
cause of the peace agreement, it may reasonably be said that its 
presence contributed to a calmer environment in which the 
Egyptian-Israeli negotiations could be pursued.48 Although the 
success of UNEF II is clear, ultimately the key to its success 
appears to have been the commitment of the parties to the 
conflict to cooperate with the peacekeeping forces and their 
mutual desire to reach an accord. 
4. United Nations Disengagement Observer Force  
In May 1974, following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, a 
disengagement agreement was signed between Israel and Syria.49 
Among its provisions, the agreement provided for an area of 
separation between Israel and Syria, and the establishment of 
UNDOF to monitor the implementation of the provisions of the 
agreement.50 The mandate of UNDOF is fairly limited and 
empowers UNDOF to “[m]aintain the ceasefire between Israel 
and Syria; [s]upervise the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian 
forces; and [s]upervise the areas of separation and limitation, as 
provided in the May 1974 Agreement on Disengagement.”51 The 
mandate of UNDOF has been continuously extended, and 
UNDOF continues to maintain an area of separation between 
 
45. Treaty of Peace, Isr.-Egypt, Mar. 26, 1979, 1136 U.N.T.S. 115, 117. 
46. UNEF II Mandate, supra note 42. 
47. See DIEHL, supra note 18, at 48–49. 
48. See id. at 49. 
49. Agreement on Disengagement Between Israeli and Syrian Forces, Syria-Isr., May 
31, 1974, reprinted in U.N. SCOR, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/11302/Add.1, Annex 1 (May 
30, 1974) [hereinafter Agreement on Disengagement]; see also United Nations 
Disengagement Observer Force [UNDOF] Background, http://www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/missions/undof/background.shtml (last visited Sept. 13, 2010). 
50. Agreement on Disengagement, supra note 49, ¶¶ B.3, E. 
51. UNDOF Mandate, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/undof/
mandate.shtml (last visited Sept. 13, 2010); see also S.C. Res. 350, 29th Year, U.N. Doc. 
S/INF/30 (May 31, 1974). 
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Israel and Syria. No military forces other than UNDOF are 
permitted in the area of separation.52 
Currently UNDOF’s activities include clearing and marking 
the existence of minefields and assisting the movement and 
services of the International Committee of the Red Cross.53 
UNDOF’s current 1035 troops are assisted by 76 UNTSO military 
observers from UNTSO’s Golan Group and supported by 
international civilian personnel and 105 local civilian staff.54 Its 
international troops are drawn from Austria, Canada, Croatia, 
India, Japan, and the Philippines.55 
The Syrian-Israeli border has been relatively quiet since the 
end of hostilities in 1973, and UNDOF has successfully carried 
out its limited monitoring role. However, the underlying conflict 
between Syria and Israel has not been resolved. Indeed, in 1984, 
Houghton and Trinka noted that “the underlying causes for the 
earlier Syrian-Israeli hostilities have not been resolved and the 
situation remains a potentially dangerous one.”56 The situation 
remains tense as a result of Syria’s continued provision of 
sanctuary to Palestinian terrorist groups operating against Israel, 
and its support of Hamas and Hezbollah.57 The authors would 
suggest that while the presence of UNDOF may contribute to 
maintaining quiet along the Israel-Syria frontier, another factor 
contributing to that quiet is that Syria is able to avoid direct 
confrontation with Israel, instead acting against them by means 
of third-parties like Hezbollah and Hamas.58 The authors would 
also not discount the factor of Syria’s desire to improve its 
relations with the United States, which continues to impose 
sanctions on Syria pursuant to the provisions of the Syrian 
Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act.59 
 
52. UNDOF Background, supra note 49. 
53. Id. 
54. UNDOF Facts and Figures, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/
undof/facts.shtml (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
55. Id. 
56. ROBERT B. HOUGHTON & FRANK G. TRINKA, MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING IN 
THE MIDDLE EAST 15 (1984). 
57. Background Note: Syria, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/
bgn/3580.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2010). 
58. Jack Khoury, Report: Syria Supplying Long-Range Missiles to Hezbollah, HAARETZ 
(Tel Aviv), Jan. 1, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1121298.html. 
59. Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, H.R. 
1828, 108th Cong. (2003); Implementation of the Syria Accountability Act, U.S. DEP’T OF 
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5. United Nations Interim Force for Southern Lebanon  
a. UNIFIL I 
During the 1970s, violent clashes between Palestinian 
terrorist groups or various Lebanese militias and Israeli forces 
continuously erupted along the Lebanese border.60 These were 
intensified by the influx of Palestinian militants who fled Jordan 
following Black September in 1970.61 In view of its mandate as an 
observer force, UNTSO forces stationed in southern Lebanon 
were not in a position to provide an effective response to the 
increasing violence. Following an attack upon an Israeli tourist 
bus in March 1978 carried out by Palestinian terrorists who 
crossed into Israel from Lebanon, the Israeli army responded 
with Operation Litani,62 aimed at ridding southern Lebanon of 
the terrorist bases that had been established there.63 
Following the Israeli incursion, the Lebanese government 
submitted a strong protest to the UN Security Council, stating 
that it had no involvement with the Palestinian attack. In 
response, the Security Council adopted Resolutions 425 and 426 
calling for the immediate cessation by Israel of its military activity 
in Lebanon, for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese 
territory, and for the establishment of a United Nations Interim 
Force in Southern Lebanon (“UNIFIL I”).64 The mandate of 
UNIFIL I was to “[c]onfirm Israeli withdrawal from southern 
Lebanon; [r]estore international peace and security; and [a]ssist 
the Lebanese Government in restoring its effective authority in 
the area.”65 Thus, UNIFIL I can be said to have been mandated 
with a dual role: one of peacekeeping and a second of 
maintaining internal law and order in Lebanon. UNIFIL I was 
not successful in carrying out its mandate, as is clear from its own 
 
COMMERCE, http://www.bis.doc.gov/licensing/syriaimplementationmay14_04.htm (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2010). 
60. See DIEHL, supra note 18, at 56; see also UNIFIL Background, http://www.un.org/
en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/background.shtml (last visited Sept. 17, 2010). 
61. Id. 
62. HOUGHTON & TRINKA, supra note 56, at 17. 
63. Id. at 29. 
64. S.C. Res. 425, ¶¶ 2–3, U.N. Doc. S/INF/34 (Mar. 19, 1978); S.C. Res. 426, ¶ 2, 
U.N. Doc. S/INF/34 (Mar. 19, 1978). 
65. UNIFIL Mandate, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/
mandate.shtml (last visited Sept. 10, 2010). 
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description of the situation leading up to Israel’s Operation 
Peace of the Galilee in June 1982.66 According to UNIFIL, Israel 
invaded Lebanon “after intense exchange of fire in Southern 
Lebanon and across the Israel-Lebanon border.”67 
Following the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 
2000, UNIFIL I returned to its role in accordance with its original 
mandate. During the period from 2000 until 2006, as UNIFIL 
notes, “periods of quiet along the Blue Line [the Israel-Lebanon 
border] were often followed by episodes of hostilities, with one of 
the incidents across the Line resulting in the killing and 
wounding of United Nations military observers. Tensions 
between the parties did not at any point appreciably diminish.”68 
This is an understatement in view of the effective takeover of 
southern Lebanon by Hezbollah following Israel’s withdrawal,69 
and the attacks across Israel’s border that ensued.70 UNIFIL I’s 
ineffectiveness in carrying out its mandate was further evidenced 
by the massive buildup of Hezbollah infrastructure and forces in 
southern Lebanon that was revealed in the course of the 2006 
Second Lebanon War.71 
b. UNIFIL II 
  In response to the Second Lebanon War, the UN Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1701 on August 11, 2006, article 8 of 
which called for the following actions: (1) a full cessation of 
hostilities; (2) the deployment by both the Lebanese army and 
UNIFIL throughout southern Lebanon; and (3) the support by 
Israel and Lebanon of a permanent ceasefire and long-term 
solution to be based, inter alia, on security arrangements aimed 
at maintaining a southern Lebanon free of military activities and 
weaponry (other than those of the Lebanese government and 
UNIFIL) and at the cessation of the sale and supply of arms to 
 
66. UNIFIL Background, supra note 60. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, The Second Lebanon War One Year Later (July 
2007), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/About+the+Ministry/Behind+the+Headlines/The+
Second+Lebanon+War+-+One+year+later+-+July+2007.htm [hereinafter One Year Later]. 
70. ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Hizbullah Attacks Along Israel’s Northern Border 
May 2000–June 2006, http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR/exeres/9EE216D7-82EF-4274-B80D-
6BBD1803E8A7frameless.htm?NRMODE=Published (last visited Sept. 10, 2010). 
71. One Year Later, supra note 69. 
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Lebanon, except as authorized by the Lebanese government.72 
To attain these goals, the Security Council extended UNIFIL’s 
force “in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of 
operations” such that the force was increased to a maximum of 
15,000 troops (UNIFIL II).73 UNIFIL’s original mandate was 
extended to provide, inter alia: (1) the monitoring of the 
cessation of hostilities; (2) the accompaniment and support of 
the Lebanese army in its deployment throughout southern 
Lebanon; and (3) the assistance in ensuring humanitarian access 
to civilian populations and the return of displaced persons.74 
Further, UNIFIL II is authorized to 
take all necessary action in areas of deployment . . . to ensure 
that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities 
of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it 
from discharging its duties . . . and to protect United Nations 
personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the 
security and freedom of movement of United Nations 
personnel, humanitarian workers and . . . to protect civilians 
under imminent threat of physical violence.75 
Although the Israeli border with Lebanon has remained 
relatively calm, it would appear that Hezbollah activities and 
military build-up, including stockpiling of arms and weaponry, 
have continued, and UNIFIL II, even with its expanded troop 
base and broadened mandate, has proved inadequate for 
preventing such activities.76 As for UNIFIL’s II contribution to 
the relative calm along Israel’s northern border since the end of 
hostilities in August 2006, former Israeli diplomat and Director 
of the Institute for National Security Studies Oded Eran explains: 
In reality, this restraint comes from the policy decision of 
Hizballah’s leaders to focus on the domestic agenda and 
solidify its political position in Lebanon. Hizballah has also 
been deterred militarily by the calculation that Israel would 
respond overwhelmingly to any provocation, striking the 
Shiite organization and/or its two major patrons, Syria and 
 
72. S.C. Res. 1701, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1701 (Aug. 11, 2006). 
73. Id. ¶ 11. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. ¶ 12. 
76. Nicholas Blanford, UN Resolution 1701: A View from Lebanon, WASH. INST. FOR 
NEAR E. POL’Y, Oct. 21, 2008, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05. 
php?CID=2940. 
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Iran. . . . [Instead] Hizballah has benefitted 
tremendously . . . fully recovering from the 2006 war and 
improving its political and military position in Lebanon. 
Under the lull provided by the ceasefire, the organization 
has managed to avoid paying a price for triggering the 2006 
war and has reasserted itself even more forcefully in 
Lebanese politics.77 
Recent rocket fire at Israel from southern Lebanon casts 
further doubt on the effectiveness of UNIFIL II, while recent 
discoveries of arms caches and explosive pits in the area under 
UNIFIL II control appear to indicate that Hezbollah has resumed 
its activities despite UNIFIL II increased presence.78 Additionally, 
reports that Hezbollah has installed long-range missile 
emplacements to the north of the area under UNIFIL II control79 
raise questions as to the usefulness of an “interposition” of 
peacekeepers to maintain a buffer zone. Hezbollah’s behavior 
sheds light upon the problems faced by a peacekeeping force 
when its mission does not enjoy the support of one or more of 
the parties to the conflict, or the full cooperation of the host 
state that it is meant to aid in restoring and maintaining order. 
D. Non-United Nations Peacekeeping Missions 
1. Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai  
The Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai, an 
extra-UN observer and peacekeeping force, was set up under the 
terms of a Protocol to the Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt 
signed on August 3, 1981.80 Annex I of the Peace Treaty called 
for the establishment of a UN observer force in the Sinai, but, as 
the date for Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai (April 25, 1982) 
drew closer, the establishment of such a force was cast into doubt 
 
77. Oded Eran, UN Resolution 1701: A View from Israel, WASH. INST. FOR NEAR E. 
POL’Y, Oct. 20, 2008, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2939. 
78. See Further Evidence of Hezbollah’s Military Activity, INTELLIGENCE AND TERRORISM 
INFO. CTR. (Jan. 7, 2010), http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/
English/eng_n/html/hezbollah_e016.htm; Rocket Fire in Northern Israel, INTELLIGENCE 
AND TERRORISM INFO. CTR. (Sept. 13, 2009), http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/
malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/lebanon_e001.htm. 
79. Howard Schneider, Hezbollah Rearms Away from Border; Future Clash with Israel 
Could Be Broader, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2010, at A10. 
80. Peace Treaty, Egypt-Isr., Mar. 26, 1979, 1136 U.N.T.S. 115. 
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due to the prospect of a Soviet veto in the Security Council.81 
Indeed, on May 18, 1981, the President of the Security Council 
advised the Egyptians that there was insufficient support in the 
Security Council to establish the required UN observer force.82  
The MFO did not enjoy the support of the entire 
international community: 
The Soviet Union and most of the Arab states refused to 
cooperate because of the MFO’s association with the Camp 
David Accords. . . . Even the United Kingdom, France, Italy, 
and the Netherlands refused to participate until it was 
agreed that their participation did not imply any change in 
their position vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli issue.83 
The United States, however, played a vital role in the 
negotiations for, and establishment of, the force. It continues to 
provide the force with both political and financial support.84 
Indeed, the support of the United States has been one of the key 
factors in the establishment and continued operation of the 
MFO.85 
Of significance, however, is the direct involvement of the 
parties to the conflict in the establishment of the force, and their 
continuing involvement in the MFO’s operations.86 The director 
general of the MFO, who must be American, is appointed by 
both parties on the recommendation of the United States, while 
the MFO force commander is appointed by the director general 
subject to the approval of Israel and Egypt. Further, Israeli and 
Egyptian liaison officers meet at least monthly with the MFO 
force commander, primarily regarding operational matters.87 
The direct expenses of the MFO are funded in equal parts by 
Egypt, Israel, and the United States. Contributions to the MFO 
are also made by Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Spain, and Switzerland.88 The participating nations (other than 
the United States) do not contribute funds to the MFO and are 
 
81. HOUGHTON & TRINKA, supra note 56, at 40. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 44. 
84. Id. at 43. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 43, 47. 
88. Financial Information, MULTINATIONAL FORCE & OBSERVERS, 
http://www.mfo.org/financial.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2010). 
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reimbursed for extraordinary costs related to their military 
units.89 
The MFO appears to be carrying out its mandate 
successfully. Unlike the other peacekeeping missions examined, 
the MFO was established in the terms of a peace treaty, and in 
their mutual relations, the parties to that treaty have shown 
themselves to be committed to its success. The mutual 
cooperation between the parties in the formation and continued 
operations of the MFO would also seem to constitute a factor in 
the continuing success of the mission. Additionally, it should be 
borne in mind that the MFO operates in a desert. The Sinai 
Peninsula provides a natural buffer between Israel and Egypt, 
and it is very sparsely populated. 
Twenty-eight years of peacekeeping virtually without 
incident might raise the question of whether the MFO actually 
fulfills a real need, or whether its continued presence merely 
reflects the absence of a concrete exit strategy. More ominously, 
in August 2005 an MFO vehicle carrying members of the 
Canadian contingent was damaged and the soldiers injured by an 
improvised explosive device (“IED”) attack, and in April 2006 an 
MFO vehicle was attacked by a suicide bomber.90 These incidents, 
although isolated, raise the issue of peacekeepers becoming the 
target of third-party “spoilers” and invite the question of 
diminishing returns. 
2. Temporary International Presence in Hebron  
a. TIPH I 
In 1994, there were several violent attacks in Hebron, including 
the infamous shooting attack by Baruch Goldstein in the Cave of 
the Patriarchs, in which twenty-nine Palestinians were killed.91 
Following this attack, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 
904, which called for an international presence in the city of 
 
89. HOUGHTON & TRINKA, supra note 56, at 52. 
90. See History, THE AUSTRALIAN OPERATION MAZURKA WEBSITE OF THE 
MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS—MFO SINAI, http://www.defence.gov.au/
army/opmazurka/History.asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2010); see also Kristina Davis, Suicide 
Bombers Attack near Canadian Contingent Serving on Op CALUMET, MAPLE LEAF (Ontario), 
May 10, 2006, at 4. 
91. Clyde Haberman, Israel Panel Says Killer at Hebron Was Acting Alone, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 27, 1994, at A1. 
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Hebron in order to “guarantee the safety and protection of the 
Palestinians.”92 On March 31, 1994, Israeli and Palestinian 
representatives signed an agreement that established the 
Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH I), a civilian 
observer mission.93 TIPH I commenced operations on May 8, 
1994 and comprised support staff and observers from Denmark, 
Italy, and Norway.94 The mandate of TIPH I was (1) to provide by 
their presence a feeling of security to the Palestinians of Hebron; 
(2) to help promote stability and an appropriate environment 
conducive to the enhancement of the well-being of the 
Palestinians of Hebron and their economic development; (3) to 
monitor the efforts to restore the safety of Palestinians and events 
affecting it and the return to normal life in the city of Hebron; 
and (4) to provide reports.95 The mandate of TIPH I came to an 
end after just three months, due to the inability of the Israeli 
government and the Palestinian leadership to reach agreement 
on the extension of the mandate.96 
b. TIPH II 
On May 12, 1996, an interim TIPH mission was established 
pursuant to the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip (“Interim Agreement” or “Oslo II”), signed at Taba 
on September 28, 1995.97 The agreement called for the 
reestablishment of a Temporary International Presence in 
Hebron.98 This interim TIPH mission was composed entirely of 
Norwegian members and was replaced in January 1997 by TIPH 
II in accordance with both the Protocol Concerning the 
 
92. S.C. Res. 904, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/Res/904 (Mar. 18, 1994); see Establishment of 
TIPH, TEMP. INT’L PRESENCE IN THE CITY OF HEBRON [TIPH], http://www.tiph.org/en/
About_TIPH/Establishment of TIPH (last visited Sept. 29, 2010) [hereinafter 
Establishment of TIPH]. 
93. See Establishment of TIPH, supra note 92. 
94. Id. 
95. See Justus R. Weiner, The Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron: A 
Unique Approach to Peacekeeping, 16 WIS. INT’L L.J. 281, 312–13 (1997). 
96. Establishment of TIPH, supra note 92. 
97. The Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization Interim Agreement on the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip, Isr.-P.L.O., Sept. 28, 1995, 36 I.L.M. 551 [hereinafter Interim 
Agreement]. 
98. Id. art. VII, ¶ 10. 
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Redeployment in Hebron,99 signed January 17, 1997, and the 
Agreement on Temporary International Presence in Hebron 
(“TIPH II Agreement”), signed on January 21, 1997 between 
Israel and the Palestinians.100 
The TIPH II Agreement directs the following general 
conduct and aims of the TIPH II mission: (1) it is to be stationed 
and operate in the city of Hebron,101 where it is granted freedom 
of movement;102 (2) it is to create a feeling of security among the 
Palestinians living in Hebron;103 (3) in all its activities, it will 
relate to the city of Hebron as one city;104 (4) its organizational 
structure, operational guidelines, logistics, support, privileges 
and immunities shall be with the agreement of the two sides;105 
and (5) its personnel shall have no military or police functions 
and they will not interfere in disputes, incidents, or the activities 
of Israeli security forces or the Palestinian police.106 TIPH 
personnel wear distinctive uniforms and do not carry weapons.107 
Building on the uniqueness of the TIPH I, the mandate of 
TIPH II includes goals that are not typical of traditional 
peacekeeping. TIPH II might be more accurately described in 
terms of the integrated force referred to in the UN Report on 
Peacekeeping Operations, comprising peacekeeping as well as socio-
economic aims. TIPH II is mandated 
1. to promote by their presence a feeling of security to the 
Palestinians of Hebron; 
 
99. Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, Isr.-P.L.O, Jan. 21, 1997, 36 
I.L.M. 650. 
100. Agreement on the Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron 
and Memorandum of Understanding, Isr.-P.L.O., art. 1, Jan. 21, 2007, 36 I.L.M. 547 
[hereinafter TIPH II Agreement]. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. art. 9. 
103. Id. art. 1. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. art. 3. 
107. Id. art. 8. Under Article 8 of the TIPH II Agreement, TIPH personnel may 
carry pistols for self-defense; however, weapons are not mentioned in the Memorandum 
of Understanding on the Establishment of a Temporary International Presence in 
Hebron signed by the participating countries, and in practice, TIPH personnel are 
unarmed. See Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of a Temporary 
International Presence in Hebron, Jan. 30, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 549 [hereinafter TIPH 
MOU]. 
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2. to help promote stability and an appropriate environment 
conducive to the enhancement of the well-being of the 
Palestinians of Hebron and their economic development; 
3. to observe the enhancement of peace and prosperity 
among Palestinians; 
4. to assist in the promotion and execution of projects 
initiated by the donor countries; [and] 
5. to encourage economic development and growth in 
Hebron.108 
As TIPH II was created by agreement between the parties 
themselves, its conduct is fully subject to the consent and 
direction of the parties. Importantly, the finances of TIPH II are 
also borne by the participating countries.109 
TIPH II is required to report any incidents or issues 
occurring in Hebron to a joint committee comprising Palestinian 
and Israeli representatives.110 TIPH II produces several types of 
reports submitted to various committees comprising Palestinian, 
Israeli, and TIPH II representation, or to the governments of the 
participating countries. The joint committee is mandated to meet 
weekly or at the request of a committee member.111 Further, 
TIPH II is mandated to coordinate its activities and policy with a 
Monitoring and Steering Committee, which was intended to be 
established in terms of the Interim Agreement.112 While the 
Committee has not yet been established, such reports are 
submitted to senior government representatives of the two 
parties.113 
It should be noted when assessing the overall success of 
TIPH II that the mission was mandated ultimately to “promote” 
the feeling of security and stability of the Palestinian residents of 
Hebron through the presence of the mission. It was not 
mandated to become directly involved in the political or social 
interactions between the Israeli and Palestinian residents of 
Hebron or to enforce peaceful relations between them, nor is its 
role to act as a buffer between Israeli and Palestinian security 
forces. As such, the operations of TIPH II are limited to 
 
108. TIPH II Agreement, supra note 100, art. 5. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. art. 7. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. TIPH MOU, supra note 107, art. B. 
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reporting incidents and issues to the parties, thus promoting a 
feeling of representation. 
Overall, it may be said that TIPH II has met with a 
significant measure of success in carrying out its mandate. The 
majority of the city’s residents are aware of TIPH’s presence and 
are of the opinion that reporting an incident to TIPH will 
improve the situation, and feel optimistic about the future.114 
However, a majority of the residents of Hebron also report 
feeling less secure.115 In fairness, this increased sense of insecurity 
may not be an indicator solely of TIPH’s effectiveness, but may 
also reflect larger external political issues. 
TIPH II is a unique mission and its civil confidence-building 
mandate is significantly different from the type of mandate 
envisaged for peacekeeping forces intended to fulfill a security 
role in a proposed Israeli-Palestinian peace accord. 
3. The Multinational Force in Lebanon  
In August 1982, the United States brokered an agreement to 
end the fighting and evacuate PLO and Syrian forces from 
Beirut, then under siege by Israeli troops in the course of 
Operation Peace for Galilee (“First Lebanon War”).116 The 
agreement provided for the deployment of a Multinational Force 
in Lebanon to oversee the evacuation of the PLO and Syrian 
forces.117 The MNF, composed of troops from France, Italy, and 
the United States began its deployment on August 21, 1982, and 
withdrew on August 30, following the evacuation of the PLO.118 
 
114. TIPH, Addressing the Perception of TIPH in Hebron—Opinion Poll 2007, 
http://www.tiph.org/?module=Files;action=File.getFile;ID=1617 (last visited Sept. 29, 
2010). 
115. Id. 
116. See Ronald F. Baczkowski, Tactical Lessons for Peacekeeping: U.S. Multinational 
Force in Beirut 1982–1984, GLOBALSECURITY, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
library/report/1995/BRF.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2010); see also US Multinational Force 
[USMNF] Lebanon, GLOBALSECURITY, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/
usmnf.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2010) [hereinafter USMNF]. 
117. See Baczkowski, supra note 116; see also John H. Kelly, Lebanon: 1982–1984, in 
U.S. AND RUSSIAN POLICYMAKING WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF FORCE 85, 92 (Jeremy R. 
Azrael & Emil A. Payin eds., 1996). 
118. See Kelly, supra note 117, at 92–93; see also Baczkowski, supra note 116; USMNF, 
supra note 116. 
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On September 14, 1982, Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel 
was assassinated.119 This was followed, two days later, by the 
massacre of Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee 
camps by members of the Lebanese Phalangist militia.120 In the 
wake of these events, US President Ronald Reagan deployed the 
US Multinational Force (“USMNF”) in Lebanon to help the 
Lebanese government restore and maintain stability.121 During 
the course of 1983, the USMNF and US missions in Lebanon 
were the targets of terrorist attacks. On April 18, 1983, the US 
embassy in West Beirut was bombed.122 On October 23, 1983, 
suicide bombers attacked the US Marine and French Paratrooper 
barracks in Beirut, killing 241 Americans and 56 French 
servicemen.123 Additionally, from August 1983 onward, American 
forces found themselves increasingly involved in fighting against 
Lebanese militias.124 Under mounting Congressional pressure, 
the President ordered the withdrawal of USMNF, which was 
completed on February 26, 1984.125 
II. UN AND NON-UN-MANDATED MISSIONS: FACTORS FOR 
SUCCESS AND FAILURE 
As the above analysis has shown, UN peacekeeping missions 
have met varying degrees of success and failure. The following 
sections will examine the various factors that may contribute to 
or detract from the effectiveness of a peacekeeping mission. 
A. The Mandate 
The mandate of UN peacekeeping missions is the result of 
political compromise among the many UN member states in the 
course of the process of authorizing a peacekeeping mission. The 
process of compromise may yield a mandate too vague and too 
 
119. See Kelly, supra note 117, at 92–93; USMNF, supra note 116. 
120. See USMNF, supra note 116; see also Kelly, supra note 117, at 93. 
121. See Kelly, supra note 117, at 93–94; USMNF, supra note 116. 
122. See Baczkowski, supra note 116; see also Kelly, supra note 117, at 98; USMNF, 
supra note 116. 
123. See Kelly, supra note 117, at 101–02; see also Baczkowski, supra note 116; 
USMNF, supra note 116. 
124. See Kelly, supra note 117, at 98–99 (describing the increased attacks on the 
Marines of the MNF by militia groups). 
125. For a detailed history and assessment, see id. at 102–03; Baczkowski, supra note 
116. 
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broadly phrased to serve as an effective guide for action. The 
same process may also yield a mandate that is too limited in its 
scope. As William Orbach succinctly notes: 
The United Nations is not an independent entity, but an 
international arena in miniature where most international 
conflicts and disputes are reenacted. It is a microcosm of the 
larger international reality. In this institution all 
international conflicts—military, economic, and political—
are reflected in and, to a certain extent, transferred to the 
political plane. The United Nations is not an actor on the 
international stage, but a microcosm of that stage.126 
This point was made even more emphatically in the 
recommendations of the Brahimi Report. In the section entitled 
“Clear, credible and achievable mandates,” the report states: 
As a political body, the Security Council focuses on 
consensus-building, even though it can take decisions with 
less than unanimity. But the compromises required to build 
consensus can be made at the expense of specificity, and the 
resulting ambiguity can have serious consequences in the 
field if the mandate is then subject to varying interpretation 
by different elements of a peace operation, or if local actors 
perceive a less than complete Council commitment to peace 
implementation that offers encouragement to spoilers. 
Ambiguity may also paper over differences that emerge later, 
under pressure of a crisis, to prevent urgent Council action. 
While it acknowledges the utility of political compromise in 
many cases, the Panel comes down in this case on the side of 
clarity, especially for operations that will deploy into 
dangerous circumstances. Rather than send an operation 
into danger with unclear instructions, the Panel urges that 
the Council refrain from mandating such a mission.127 
For example, the mandates of UNIFIL I and II—calling, 
inter alia, for the mission to restore international peace and 
security, as well as the effective authority of the Lebanese 
government—set out aims so broad and intangible as to be 
impractical. On the other hand, a mandate calling for a mission 
 
126. WILLIAM W. ORBACH, TO KEEP THE PEACE: THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONDEMNATORY RESOLUTION 136 (1977). 
127. Brahimi Report, supra note 11, ¶ 56. 
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to act solely as a buffer128 or to supervise the withdrawal of a force 
and the cessation of hostilities per the mandates of UNEF I and 
II and UNDOF, may not provide the mission with sufficient 
latitude for an effective response to hostilities or a breach of the 
ceasefire. Of course, whenever it becomes necessary to extend 
the mission’s mandate, the time-consuming political process of 
compromise begins anew. 
As opposed to UN peacekeeping missions, the process of 
drafting the mandates of multinational peacekeeping operations 
may be less susceptible to the shortcomings inherent in the UN 
drafting process. Where the mandate is drafted primarily by the 
parties, it is more likely that the mandate will more accurately 
address their concerns, and may be expected to provide 
mechanisms that the parties themselves deem necessary and 
adequate for the effective achievement of the peacekeeping goals 
that they have established. 
The mandates of the MFO and TIPH II may serve as 
examples of this conflict-specific focus that may be achieved 
when a peacekeeping force is established primarily in accordance 
with guidelines established by the parties to the conflict. Thus, 
for example, the MFO mandate was drafted in the context of a 
peace treaty between two previously warring states. The 
peacekeeping functions of the MFO are therefore security 
focused and are intended to reinforce the peace treaty. The 
TIPH II mandate was drafted to address civil unrest in the volatile 
social context of Hebron. The role of that mission as an address 
for reporting grievances and promoting socio-economic 
objectives are of particular significance, as is reflected in the 
mandate. 
Moreover, because the mandate of a non-UN peacekeeping 
mission is a product of negotiations between the parties and is 
meant to address their specific concerns, amendments to the 
mandate necessary for it to be effective can be decided upon by 
 
128. This, for example, was the mandate of the United Nations Military Observer 
Group in India and Pakistan (“UNMOGIP”), about which the UN Secretary General 
stated: “Because the role of UNMOGIP appears frequently to be misunderstood, it bears 
emphasis that the operation has no authority or function entitling it to enforce or 
prevent anything, or to try to ensure that the Cease-Fire is respected.” U.N. Secretary-
General, Report by the Secretary-General on the Current Situation in Kashmir with 
Particular Reference to the Cease-Fire Agreement, the Cease-Fire Line and the 
Functioning of UNMOGIP, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/6651 (Sept. 3, 1965). 
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the parties to the conflict, and while they will require the consent 
of the contributing states, the process should be far more 
efficient than the parallel UN process. 
B. Political Support 
Any peacekeeping mission will necessarily be subject to 
shifting political winds. Changes in political alignments and 
commitments are not exclusive to the diplomatic process of the 
UN. They can arise among and within the states contributing 
forces or support to a multinational force, and they can affect the 
conduct of the mission and its staying power. An example of this 
is the withdrawal of MNF, described in Section II D.3, and by the 
withdrawal of the Polish contingent from UNIFIL in 2009.129 
Another example is the extraction of Belgian troops from the 
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda following the 
death of ten Belgian troops and continued threats against 
Belgian nationals.130 The recent collapse of the Netherland’s 
coalition government due to disagreements on extending the 
deployment of Dutch forces in Afghanistan also provides an 
instructive example.131 
In the case of UN peacekeeping missions, an additional 
element that must be borne in mind is the possibility of a veto, 
either because of a threat to the direct interests or ambitions of a 
permanent member of the Security Council or in deference to its 
political alliances.132 
 
129. See November 2009: Lebanon, SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT, 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.5566459/k.E00/
November_2009brLebanon.htm (noting that the Polish contingent was due to withdraw 
in October 2009). On the prospect that France, Italy, and Spain may follow suit, see 
Yaakov Katz, Israel Concerned Indonesia Might Take Charge of UNIFIL Naval Force, 
JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 28, 2010, at 3. 
130. See United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, U.N. DEP’T OF PUB. INFO., 
Sept. 1996, http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unamir_b.htm. 
131. Ian Traynor, Dutch Coalition Collapses after Row Over Troops’ Afghan Mission, 
GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 22, 2010, at 24. 
132. Examples are: the USSR’s veto of the American proposal in regard to the 
United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (“UNOGIL”) in 1958, see United 
Nations Peacekeeping, Lebanon—UNOGIL Background, http://www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/missions/past/unogilbackgr.html#one (last visited Mar. 3, 2010); the 
veto by the Ukrainian SSR and USSR of the proposal for a UN peacekeeping mission to 
Lebanon in February 1984, see S.C. Res. France: Revised Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc. 
S/16351/Rev. 2 (Feb. 28, 1984); and the threatened Soviet veto that led to the 
establishment of the MFO, see HOUGHTON & TRINKA, supra note 56. 
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C. Bias or Perception of Bias 
One of the basic principles in a UN mission is neutrality or 
impartiality.133 Indeed, impartiality was one of the originally 
envisaged underpinnings of a UN peacekeeping mission, as first 
conceived by Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN Secretary General 
under whom peacekeeping missions were most broadly 
developed.134 A peacekeeping mission that is perceived as biased 
by one of the parties to a conflict may face insurmountable 
difficulties to carrying out its mandate. A suspicious party may 
refrain from fully cooperating with the mission, viewing its 
cooperation as futile or even potentially harmful to its own 
interests. 
While the problems arising from actual bias and perceived 
bias may be different, ultimately either can result in the failure of 
the mission. Indeed, arguably, a perception of bias may be more 
difficult to address as the bias may not be demonstrable, and 
there may be no concrete steps that might serve to change the 
perception. 
Perceptions and accusations of bias have been particularly 
prominent in regard to UNIFIL, which has, at various times, been 
accused of bias by Israel, Lebanon, and Hezbollah.135 In addition 
to evidence of actual bias in its conduct toward the parties, or 
perceptions of bias that may arise from ineffectiveness of the 
mission in carrying out its mission from the perspective of one of 
the parties, UN peacekeeping missions are also susceptible to 
being perceived as operating in accordance with the political 
agendas of the contributing countries or biases of the United 
Nations itself. 
Some of the pitfalls arising from distrust and perceptions of 
bias may be avoided in the case of multinational peacekeeping 
forces where the contributing powers are agreed upon by the 
parties to the conflict. Of course it is not impossible that a 
multinational force could be the subject of accusations of bias. In 
a highly politicized climate, and specifically in the context of 
 
133. Capstone Doctrine, supra note 13. 
134. CHARLES C. MOSKOS, PEACE SOLDIERS 25–26 (1976). 
135. See Hagai Segal, Is the UN up to the Task of Peacemaker?, SOUTH CHINA MORNING 
POST (H.K.), Aug. 15, 2006, at A13; Lebanon Blasts Called “Spy Devices”, ALJAZEERA 
(Doha), Oct. 19, 2009, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/10/
2009101918327389491.html. 
  
28 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34:1 
politically sensitive issues that form the background to any 
peacekeeping force, bias and subjectivity are typically of concern. 
However, the active involvement of the parties to the conflict in 
the establishment, selection, and continued operations of the 
force can contribute to attenuating distrust and perceptions of 
bias. Where the peacekeeping force operates in concert with the 
parties toward attaining mutually desired goals, the underlying 
suspicions that feed perceptions of bias may be further reduced. 
Moreover, joint control and structured mechanisms for 
addressing grievances may also prove effective in responding to 
the concerns of the parties. 
D. Rules of Engagement 
Dag Hammarskjöld envisaged a UN peacekeeping force as a 
conciliation force that does not engage in combat activities.136 In 
keeping with this vision, the rules of engagement for UN 
peacekeeping forces have been very circumscribed. The 
fundamental rule is that the peacekeeping soldier is only 
permitted to use force in self-defense.137 Unfortunately, the term 
“self-defense” is not unambiguous. Individual self-defense is 
always permitted to UN peacekeepers.138 After all, as has been 
noted, no country would contribute its troops to a UN mission 
unless they are permitted to defend themselves if attacked.139 
However, problems arise when self-defense requires actions that 
go beyond the limits of personal defense, extending to the 
defense of the mission or actions intended to facilitate the 
accomplishment of the mission’s mandate. Limiting the resort to 
the use of force to a strict definition of self-defense may render 
the mission unviable. Where, for example, the peacekeeping 
mission faces militias or guerilla groups actively seeking to 
undermine peacekeeping activities, such as in the case of 
Hezbollah in Lebanon, a peacekeeping force empowered to use 
force only when attacked will be hard pressed to fulfill its 
peacekeeping mandate. The Capstone Doctrine notes: 
The environments into which United Nations 
peacekeeping operations are deployed are often 
 
136. MOSKOS, supra note 134, at 25. 
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characterized by the presence of militias, criminal gangs, and 
other spoilers who may actively seek to undermine the peace 
process or pose a threat to the civilian population. In such 
situations, the Security Council has given United Nations 
peacekeeping operations “robust” mandates authorizing 
them to “use all necessary means” to deter forceful attempts 
to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under 
imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national 
authorities in maintaining law and order.140 
While this broad concept of “robust” self-defense seeks to 
address a real problem in defining the appropriate limits of self 
defense and the need to expand the meaning of the term so that 
its limitations do not thwart the peacekeeping mission, it is 
inherently problematic. 
While refraining from using force may make a peacekeeping 
operation ineffective, fuel perceptions of bias, and even cause the 
parties to the conflict to view the mission as a hindrance, the 
resort to force is itself not without dangers. As the Capstone 
Doctrine recognizes, “The use of force by a United Nations 
peacekeeping operation always has political implications and can 
often give rise to unforeseen circumstances.”141 Moreover, a 
decision to use force must be mindful of “the effect that such 
action will have on national and local consent for the mission.”142 
A multinational force faces similar problems in defining its 
rules of engagement. However, as a force working in concert with 
the parties to the conflict toward achieving mutually desired 
goals, the danger of a loss of confidence and consent may be 
reduced. The cooperative basis for its operations may also make 
it possible to better adapt the rules of engagement to the specific 
conditions under which it operates, and more specifically, define 
what is permitted in given circumstances. This could lead to 
greater mission effectiveness as well as greater confidence in the 
ability of the mission to carry out its operational tasks. 
While seeking to address real problems impacting the 
effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, the concept of 
“robust” self-defense raises two additional, inter-related problems 
in regard to any peacekeeping operation: exposure to increased 
 
140. Capstone Doctrine, supra note 13, at 34. 
141. Id. at 35 
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casualties and erosion of political support. The active use of force 
unavoidably increases the exposure of peacekeepers to danger. It 
may also cause third-party spoilers to view the peacekeepers not 
merely as a hindrance but as a hostile force and a legitimate 
target. The willingness and motivation of peacekeepers to expose 
themselves to the dangers of combat cannot be assumed. The 
loss of life attendant to such actions, whether to the forces 
themselves or from the collateral risks to the local populace, may 
also make continued participation in the mission unpopular in 
the contributing states and lead to a demand for the withdrawal 
of the peacekeepers. 
E. Command and Control 
In general, the United Nations command structure is largely 
decentralized, with operational authority vested in individual 
force and police commanders in the field.143 These commanders 
are answerable to a civilian Special Representative of the 
Secretary General (“SRSG”)144 who provides strategic decision-
making for mandate implementation.145 The Under Secretary 
General for Peacekeeping Operations has overall responsibility, 
while the United Nations Headquarters in New York (“UNHQ”) 
provides overall strategic guidance.146 In less complex missions, 
this decentralized command and control structure of UN 
operations is feasible. However, when faced with more intricate, 
robust missions, the UN command and control model becomes 
problematic as there is a “growing gap between increasingly 
ambitious mandates and limited military capacities”147 such that 
“[t]he UN model thus seems to combine the worst of two worlds: 
 
143. See BRUCE JONES ET AL., NYU CTR. ON INT’L COOPERATION, BUILDING ON 
BRAHIMI: PEACEKEEPING IN AN ERA OF STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY 41 (2009) [hereinafter 
BUILDING ON BRAHIMI]; Jean-Marie Guéhenno & Jake Sherman, Command and Control 
Arrangements in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, International Forum for the 
Challenges of Peace Operations, ¶ 16, Nov. 9, 2009, available at 
http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peace_ssr/docs/Background%20Paper_Command%20and%20
Control%20Arrangements%20in%20UN%20Peacekeeping%20Operations_9%20Novem
ber%202008.pdf.  
144. BUILDING ON BRAHIMI, supra note 143, at 41. 
145. Guéhenno & Sherman, supra note 143, ¶16. 
146. Id. 
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too much military decentralization and too much political 
control over the conduct of military operations.”148 
The more complex peacekeeping missions face many issues 
and challenges that are directly relevant to the mission’s success 
or failure. One such prominent issue is that force commanders 
and SRSG’s face increased challenges to their authority and 
command over the peacekeeping troops as the levels of danger 
and threat to the peacekeepers increase.149 In such situations, 
national chains of command of the individual contributing states 
tend to become more prominent, competing with the established 
command structure.150 Further, as danger levels increase, 
tensions may rise between the civilian command structure at 
UNHQ and the commanders in the field.151 The political 
consensus informing the interpretation and implementation of 
the mandate at UNHQ might conflict fundamentally with that of 
the force commanders in the field, and in particular with the 
increased national military interests of each contributing 
member state. 
Another issue faced in the more complex missions is the 
distance between UNHQ, where overall strategy is planned, and 
the theater of operations, where operative decisions are taken. In 
the Command and Control Arrangements Report, the authors 
refer to the difficulty involved in “[s]triking the right balance 
between creating a sense of ownership in the mission and 
maintaining UN control [as] . . . a delicate, but essential task.”152 
In this regard, the authors note that “[t]oo much 
decentralization can make such control difficult.”153 Of course, 
strategic high-level control at United Nations level is subject to 
the broader political considerations that may not be relevant or 
significant for the operational decisions taken in light of the 
realities on the ground. This is particularly acute in the context 
of “missions [that] concern regional or great powers, as in . . . 
the Middle East.”154 Further problematic issues in this context 
arise where 
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[d]ifferent members of the Security Council may have 
different expectations with the mission, and they may try to 
influence it directly, through their nationals in the mission. 
It may then put the Secretariat in a delicate situation if a 
high-risk operation encouraged by a Member State goes 
wrong, or if it is seen as contradicting the interpretation of 
the mandate made by other Member States.155 
At times, national units have informally and quietly, without 
the knowledge of UNHQ, informed the force commander as to 
the limits of their engagement (instead of making them clear in 
official caveats inserted into their initial memoranda of 
understanding arranged with UNHQ). This leads to even greater 
distance between UNHQ and reduces the overall effectiveness of 
the force.156 Furthermore, for the selection of the SRSG to be a 
political choice—and “[t]he selection of Force Commanders has 
also been politicized at times.”157 
These command and control issues can negatively affect 
peacekeeping missions, particularly those that call for robust 
action and a multi-dimensional approach. The tension between 
the overall strategic vision, largely politically guided, and the 
military needs dictated by realities on the ground can be 
extreme. 
The less complex command structure of a force operating in 
concert with the parties to the conflict may mitigate these 
problematic aspects of the UN-mandated mission. Moreover, 
because the overall strategic aims and the specific operational 
activities are aimed at achieving the same goals, the interaction 
between the two levels is likely to be less strained. Nevertheless, 
the involvement of several parties—even under a unified 
command—cannot entirely avoid all of the political and practical 
problems that may arise when the peacekeeping force must 
achieve consent from a number of actors. Even when all the 
actors aspire to a common goal, they do not necessarily share the 
same military or political culture, and are not free of political 
interests and pressures. 
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F. Financing 
The Building on Brahimi report notes that the total costs of 
UN peacekeeping missions have steadily increased, with the 
budget for UN peacekeeping reaching US$8 billion in 2008–
2009, marking a ten percent increase over the 2007–2008 period 
and a five-fold increase in just under a decade.158 Further, the 
largest funders of the UN peacekeeping missions are also 
typically the main contributors towards other international 
military or regional groupings such as NATO or the EU.159 With 
their funding commitments split, and with UN peacekeeping 
becoming increasingly complex and expensive, maintaining the 
required level of commitment to funding UN peacekeeping 
missions cannot be taken for granted. The global financial crisis 
will certainly be a complicating factor. It is also important to 
realize that funding can be exploited as a means for exerting 
political control over the scope and operations of a mission. 
The funding models of non-UN-mandated forces present 
certain advantages, even if they are not without problems. A non-
UN-mandated force, established by an agreement between the 
parties, should be funded primarily by the parties themselves, as 
in the cases of TIPH I and II and the MFO. Where possible, this 
financial model can yield a number of advantageous 
consequences in terms of the commitment of the parties to the 
success of the mission. Of course, as Diehl points out, the risk of 
financial “blackmail” of a mission remains possible in the 
multinational force context, including the possibility that a party 
could withhold financial commitments in order to leverage 
control over the conduct of a mission.160 Moreover, while 
maintaining a civilian observer force like TIPH may be relatively 
affordable, equipping and maintaining a robust military 
peacekeeping operation may be beyond the independent 
resources of the parties, and may require some third-party 
funding, either directly or through earmarked foreign aid to the 
parties. Another model, employed in part in funding the MFO, is 
one in which some states provide funds exclusively for 
maintaining the force, while other states provide personnel. 
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G. Troop Composition 
A UN peacekeeping force is composed of troops from 
various and sometimes numerous countries. A single 
peacekeeping mission can be comprised of troops from as many 
as thirty different countries (as in the case of UNIFIL II). This 
can be the source of a variety of problems. On the one end of the 
scale are more technical problems, such as language and cultural 
differences that may lead to serious breakdowns in 
communications. Differences in military training and approach 
can also hamper the smooth operation of the mission. Another 
factor that cannot be overlooked is that of differing military 
cultures and the possibility that contingents from different 
participating countries may be bound by different rules of 
engagement and even conflicting legal approaches, either 
deriving from their domestic law or arising from treaty 
obligations. Among the more complex issues that may arise are 
those deriving from the possible bias of troops from certain 
national contingents. The willingness of host countries to 
cooperate with troops from hostile nations can also lead to 
problems of cooperation. For example, both Iran and Poland 
contributed troops to UNDOF, but neither maintained 
diplomatic relations with Israel at the time. This complicated 
Israeli cooperation with UNDOF’s freedom of movement.161 
Some of these problems can be mitigated by limiting the 
number of participating states and by adopting appropriate 
vetting procedures. Such steps are inherently better suited to a 
multinational force option than to a UN force. The MFO and 
TIPH II would appear to provide successful models in this 
regard. 
Nevertheless, the UN model enjoys an advantage in its 
ability to turn to a broader base. For example, the domestic law 
of some countries prohibits the contribution of troops to non-
UN-mandated missions.162 Additionally, some countries may 
perceive a UN mandate as granting greater legitimacy to the 
mission, a factor that may be important in its internal political 
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Israel. See Katz, supra note 129. 
162. See Katz, supra note 129. 
  
2010] PEACEKEEPERS IN ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE 35 
debate. Further, it is has been argued that national domestic 
concerns could make a country more inclined to withdraw its 
forces deployed under a national flag than those deployed under 
the UN flag.163 
H. Involvement/Commitment of the Parties 
Consent of the parties is regarded as a basic principle of UN 
peacekeeping.164 The greater the involvement of the parties, and 
the greater their commitment to the peacekeeping mission and 
to the eventual resolution of the underlying conflict, the more 
likely that the peacekeeping mission will succeed. While it is 
hoped that a UN peacekeeping force set up and operating in the 
context of a peace agreement will enjoy the full support of the 
parties, unequivocal support cannot be assumed or assured. The 
drafters of the Capstone Doctrine were aware of this issue: 
The absence of trust between the parties in a post-conflict 
environment can, at times, make consent uncertain and 
unreliable. Consent, particularly if given grudgingly under 
international pressure, may be withdrawn in a variety of ways 
when a party is not fully committed to the peace process. For 
instance . . . [by] restrict[ing] the operation’s freedom of 
action, resulting in a de facto withdrawal of consent . . . . The 
fact that the main parties have given their consent to the 
deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation 
does not necessarily imply or guarantee that there will also 
be consent at the local level, particularly if the main parties 
are internally divided or have weak command and control 
systems. Universality of consent becomes even less probable 
in volatile settings, characterized by the presence of armed 
groups not under the control of any of the parties, or by the 
presence of other spoilers . . . . A peacekeeping operation 
must have the political and analytical skills, the operational 
resources, and the will to manage situations where there is 
an absence or breakdown of local consent. In some cases this 
may require, as a last resort, the use of force.165 
Arguably, in circumstances like those described above, a 
multinational force created by the agreement of the parties will 
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enjoy a distinct advantage. Ownership of the process is likely to 
produce better results than submission of the process to a body 
in which the political considerations and national interests of 
other states play a significant role. As Jett observes, “[A]n 
agreement that has been facilitated rather than mediated, 
inherently has a better chance for success because the parties 
have greater responsibility for the agreement’s shape.”166 But 
attaining the level of cooperation required for the establishment 
of an effective multinational presence may not be practical in the 
absence of basic trust between the parties to the conflict. A 
significant presence of “spoilers” may also argue in favor of a UN-
mandated operation where such a mission might enjoy greater 
legitimacy in the eyes of the parties to the conflict. 
I. Spoilers 
The problem of spoilers is addressed in the Capstone 
Doctrine.167 It is counted among the factors likely to affect 
peacekeeping operations in the next three to seven years, as 
described in the 2009 NYU Report: 
First, spoilers: as the Brahimi Report established, even where 
there is broad support for a political process, splinter groups, 
rogue actors or individuals may use violence to undermine 
the process, and missions must be able to respond to them. 
The spoiler problem is greater when (i) there are several 
parties to the conflict; (ii) spoilers include groups motivated 
by factors outside the immediate conflict, such as 
international terrorist networks; or (iii) spoilers include 
factions of a recognized government.168 
The presence of spoilers cannot be discounted in the context of 
both the UN-mandated peacekeeping forces and the non-UN-
mandated multinational forces. By definition, spoilers are 
external to the process and antagonistic to it. 
The moral or symbolic value of a UN-mandated 
peacekeeping force as “an international force representing the 
world community’s desire for peace”169 may well be a factor in its 
favor, as the authors have proposed elsewhere in this Article. 
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However, it would be a mistake to overemphasize the deterrent 
factor of “international legitimacy.” Non-state spoilers act outside 
of the norms of international humanitarian law. Reciprocity is 
not relevant to their conduct and they have nothing to gain by 
adherence to the rules. The idea that “[a]ny protagonist 
choosing to renew hostilities will bear the costs of international 
disapproval and perhaps sanctions”170 is an empty threat in 
regard to armed militias, terrorists, and other spoilers that have 
no presence at the United Nations, that are, by their nature, 
already the subjects of international disapproval, and for which 
the threat of sanctions is irrelevant. 
J. Regional Players 
The significant role of regional players in the success of a 
peacekeeping mission is referred to in the Capstone Doctrine, 
which notes that “[t]he attitude of neighbouring states can be as 
important a factor in determining the viability of a peace process, 
as the commitment of the local parties, some of whom may even 
be acting as proxies for neighbouring states.”171 
Again, as is the case with spoilers, the presence of 
destructive regional players, in particular where they act through 
local agents, such as local militias or terror networks, is 
problematic for both UN-mandated and non-UN-mandated 
peacekeeping missions. Here, too, the threat of sanctions may be 
of little relevance when neighboring states maintain deniability 
by acting through proxies. 
III. THE ISRAELI CALCULATION—RISK VERSUS BENEFIT 
Peacekeeping operations have been a common element in 
the context of the ongoing conflict between Israel and her 
neighbors. Although no peacekeeping provisions were 
established under the Treaty of Peace between Israel and 
Jordan,172 or as part of the Declaration of Principles on Interim 
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Self-Government Arrangements173 or the Israeli-Palestinian 
Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,174 the 
establishment of a peacekeeping force is widely assumed to be 
integral to any future Israeli-Palestinian peace accord. 
The two basic models for peacekeeping are the UN-
mandated peacekeeping force and the non-UN multinational 
force. Both of these models have been tried in the context of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict with varying degrees of success. The question 
to be addressed now is whether the adoption of one of those 
models would make a constructive contribution to the peaceful 
relations between Israel and a future Palestinian state. 
Peacekeeping missions are particularly successful in 
fulfilling their mandate in regard to conflicts that have already 
been resolved. The success of a peacekeeping mission is directly 
proportional to the level of mutual trust, commitment, and 
cooperation of the parties to the conflict: the stronger those 
elements, the greater the success. The NYU Report states this in 
another way: “[C]redible political process and credible military 
presence should reinforce one another. Ideally, they are inversely 
related: the more credible the political process, the less the need 
for a military presence.”175 Parties to a conflict or to a process 
intended to resolve a conflict should not imagine that a 
peacekeeping mission can be a substitute for any of those 
elements. Just as a peacekeeping mission will reinforce the 
positive, it has the potential to highlight and even exacerbate the 
negative. It may even become a source of friction or a target, and 
thus contribute to further deterioration. 
A. Best-Case Scenario 
In the situation envisaged by those who propose a 
peacekeeping force as part of the resolution of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, the force is intended to be an element of the 
final status. It is proposed neither as a facilitator for conflict 
resolution nor as a buffer between the parties that will enable 
them to negotiate in a less contentious atmosphere. This would 
 
173. See Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Isr.), 
Sept. 13, 1993, avaiable at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+ 
Peace+ Process/Declaration+of+Principles.htm. 
174. See Interim Agreement, supra note 97. 
175. BUILDING ON BRAHIMI, supra note 143, at 17. 
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seem to provide a strong basis for the success of a peacekeeping 
operation. 
In a best-case scenario, following the resolution of a conflict 
by parties committed to peaceful coexistence, the example of the 
MFO reinforces the positive view. Indeed, in such an ideal 
situation, each of the peacekeeping options offers certain 
advantages. 
Because mutual trust, commitment to maintaining peace, 
and cooperation directly affect peacekeeping success, there 
would seem to be an inherent advantage to missions that are 
created by the parties and that are answerable to them. Such 
missions are an expression of the cooperation and ongoing 
commitment and may serve to enhance mutual trust. They also 
avoid some of the political pitfalls discussed above. From an 
Israeli perspective, this type of multinational force may also be 
preferable inasmuch as Israel tends not to view the UN as a 
particularly hospitable forum. Moreover, the possibility that the 
force might receive its marching orders in accordance with the 
political consensus of the UN member states might be seen by 
Israel as a cause for worry. However, to the extent that the 
Palestinians might view the UN as a supportive forum and an ally, 
the Palestinians might prefer the UN option. This option might 
also be deemed preferable for the Palestinians for the perception 
of “international legitimacy” that may be important both from a 
domestic and pan-Arab political perspective. While a UN-
mandated multinational force would directly conflict with the 
Israeli interest, a multinational force consisting of solely the 
parties to the conflict might be seen to serve it. 
Ultimately, in a best-case scenario, the decreasing need for 
peacekeeping means that the most important function of the 
operation is its physical and ultimately symbolic presence. The 
bottom line is that Israel has to consider what type of force would 
best serve this largely emblematic role, while bearing in mind 
such factors as the proximity of the frontier to Israeli population 
centers and the perception of the force by the Israeli public. 
Of course, a third possibility in such an atmosphere of 
commitment and cooperation is the adoption of security 
arrangements like those set out in the Israeli-Jordanian Peace 
Treaty. In that framework, the parties agreed upon security 
relations based upon “mutual trust, advancement of joint 
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interests and co-operation,”176 and upon a consultation and 
liaison mechanism for addressing questions of implementation 
without the involvement of third parties. That arrangement 
appears to have resulted in significant success. 
B. Worst-Case Scenarios 
As the Brahimi Report duly notes, “the Secretariat must not 
apply best-case planning assumptions to situations where the 
local actors have historically exhibited worst-case behaviour.”177 
This need to consider worst-case scenarios is also noted in the 
Capstone Doctrine, which observes that “[p]lanning based solely 
on short-term engagement and best case scenarios has rarely 
proven to be a successful basis for the deployment of a United 
Nations peacekeeping mission and should be avoided.”178 This 
trenchant observation must be borne in mind when considering 
the appropriate approach to peacekeeping in the context of an 
Israeli-Palestinian accord. 
While the future cannot accurately be predicted, past and 
present reality can serve as the basis for suggesting certain 
elements of possible worst-case scenarios. Among these elements 
are the following possible factors: (1) the government of the 
Palestinian state may not be committed wholeheartedly to 
peaceful relations, or may deem an overt or overly zealous 
commitment to peace to be an obstacle to its internal political 
interests; (2) Hamas or other opponents of the peace agreement 
may violently oppose the Palestinian government; (3) Hamas or 
other opponents of the peace agreement may continue to try to 
operate against Israel; (4) Israeli settlement blocs or enclaves may 
remain within the territory of the Palestinian state and may be 
targeted by spoilers; (5) Israeli opponents to the peace 
agreement may attempt to reassert their presence in evacuated 
areas; (6) Israeli opponents to the peace agreement may attempt 
violent opposition to the Palestinian state. Each of these possible 
scenarios must be considered in weighing the appropriate 
security arrangements to be made as part of a peace accord. 
 
176. Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty, supra note 172, art. 4.1(a). 
177. Brahimi Report, supra note 11, at x. 
178. Capstone Doctrine, supra note 13, at 51. 
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If the Palestinian side is not wholly committed to 
maintaining peaceful relations, the possibility of establishing an 
entente like that of the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty is 
precluded. Such a situation would also not produce the level of 
coordination and cooperation needed for establishing a 
multinational force. The remaining option is a UN-mandated 
peacekeeping mission operating in a situation that is not 
conducive to its success. The extent of its failure to realize its 
mission will largely be dictated by the nature of the Palestinians’ 
lack of commitment and the intensity of spoiler activity. 
The scenario in which commitment to peaceful relations is 
accompanied by a desire to avoid any overt expression of 
cooperation with the former enemy or with the peacekeeping 
operation also argues strongly in favor of a peacekeeping 
operation rather than a regime of security cooperation between 
the parties. On its face, such a situation would seem to favor a 
UN-mandated mission, however, the experience of the MFO and 
TIPH may support the view that the actual level of cooperation 
demanded of the parties may not be to such a degree that it 
would appear as overt cooperation or “collaboration.” 
The presence of spoilers acting against the Palestinian 
government from within the territory of the Palestinian state 
raises additional considerations. First, the need to act against 
internal spoilers raises a question as to how a government wishes 
to be perceived domestically. If the government wishes to be seen 
as acting forcefully against its opponents, then it might prefer the 
presence of a multinational force acting together with its own 
security forces, with full cooperation, intelligence sharing, and 
joint leadership. Such a force might also be deemed preferable 
by Israel due to the high level of cooperation and because the 
exclusion of the UN might be seen as advantageous where the 
spoilers may be supported or encouraged by UN member states 
that may try to influence or thwart the mission. 
If a UN-mandated mission were considered in such 
circumstances, it would have to be “robust.”179 Such a 
peacekeeping force, operating independently by a UN command 
might, at least to some degree, free the Palestinian government 
from any appearance of “collaboration” in the fight against other 
 
179. See supra Part II.D. 
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Palestinian groups. Such a non-committal position might not be 
seen favorably by Israel, and the presence of a UN force might 
not allay Israeli security concerns, both because, as stated above, 
the spoilers may be supported by or acting on behalf of member 
states, and because it would mean that an element of Israel’s 
security would be dependent upon a type of peacekeeping 
operation that has not proven successful in the past. 
Additionally, in this regard, it is worth noting a warning 
from the Brahimi Report: 
Willingness of Member States to contribute troops to a 
credible operation of this sort also implies a willingness to 
accept the risk of casualties on behalf of the mandate. 
Reluctance to accept that risk has grown since the difficult 
missions of the mid-1990s, partly because Member States are 
not clear about how to define their national interests in 
taking such risks, and partly because they may be unclear 
about the risks themselves.180 
Experience shows that the possibility that peacekeepers may 
become targets and that their involvement in robust 
peacekeeping may lead to casualties creates another major 
obstacle. 
A situation that envisages spoilers acting against Israel is one 
that directly addresses Israel’s own domestic security policy. It is 
unlikely that Israel would agree to relinquish its right to self-
defense, entrust the protection of its citizens to a foreign agent, 
or in any way compromise its sovereignty. The presence of some 
kind of multinational force, acting in concert with Israel and 
intended to prevent infiltration across Israel’s frontier, might 
constitute a positive element in such a situation, but it might also 
be viewed as a possible hindrance and obstruction to effective 
Israeli action. However, the possibility that the mandate of such a 
force might also permit it to act against spoilers within the 
Palestinian territory might be seen as an advantage. Such a 
mandate, if effective, could avoid the problematic scenario of 
Israeli forces violating Palestinian sovereignty in pursuing 
terrorist threats. Ideally, however, it would seem preferable that 
Israel and the Palestinian state act together in this area, in a 
manner similar to the Israeli-Jordanian model, inasmuch as the 
 
180. Brahimi Report, supra note 11, ¶ 52. 
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presence of a foreign force operating independently on Israel’s 
behalf within the Palestinian state might be domestically 
unpalatable to the Palestinian side and further exacerbate the 
situation. Here too, the possibility that the peacekeepers might 
themselves become targets cannot be ruled out, and the 
inevitable casualties incurred in such peacekeeping can 
undermine the missions. 
The last three scenarios envisage various Israeli elements 
that might affect the Israeli approach to incorporating a 
peacekeeping force as part of a peace accord. While each 
scenario presents its own problems, they share the common 
element that in each case Israeli nationals would be confronted 
by foreign troops. In the case of Israeli enclaves, the situation 
would be one of entirely submitting the safety and security of 
Israeli communities to foreign control. This might be 
ameliorated, from the perspective of the Israeli nationals, by the 
posting of Israeli troops within the communities. But such an 
option would mean a permanent Israeli military presence within 
the Palestinian state, and could form an ongoing source of 
friction. In any case, the idea of placing the security of Israelis 
directly in the hands of UN or multinational peacekeepers 
would, in all likelihood, be unacceptable in Israeli domestic 
politics. 
In the case of Israelis attempting to reassert an Israeli or 
Jewish presence, for example, in evacuated settlements or sites 
like Joseph’s Tomb, experience has shown that confrontations 
intended to remove such “demonstrators” may become violent. 
This potential for deadly confrontation becomes almost 
inevitable considering the possibility of Israelis taking violent 
action against the Palestinian state. From the point of view of 
Israeli domestic politics, any such situation would preferably be 
handled by Israeli security personnel. Perhaps such a unique 
arrangement can be made in the framework of a peacekeeping 
mandate. It is also possible that proper relations between Israel 
and a future Palestinian state, including mutual respect for 
sovereignty, would best treat such events as matters of internal 
security that should not form part of any peacekeeping mandate, 
and should only be addressed in the framework of mutual 
security cooperation and foreign relations. 
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Indeed, it is worth noting that Article XVII of the Interim 
Agreement, addressing the issue of jurisdiction, states, “[I]ssues 
that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: 
Jerusalem, settlements, specified military locations, Palestinian 
refugees, borders, foreign relations and Israelis . . . .”181 It would 
appear that the parties envisaged some kind of jurisdictional 
arrangement that would not involve foreign actors. At present, 
Israelis who enter areas under complete control of the 
Palestinian Authority are dealt with by the Palestinian security 
authorities, often in cooperation with Israeli authorities. A recent 
example was seen in the ancient synagogue in Jericho, where, at 
Israel’s request, the Palestinian police at the scene permitted 
Israeli border policemen to forcibly remove and arrest the Israeli 
demonstrators.182 
CONCLUSION 
The conventional wisdom is that the success of a future 
peace agreement between Israel and an envisaged Palestinian 
state would require the support of an international peacekeeping 
mission. In this Article, the authors have reviewed the history and 
relative success and failure of peacekeeping missions in the 
region. The authors have also examined the salient factors that 
appear to contribute to the prospects for success or failure of a 
peacekeeping mission. On that basis, they have considered the 
advantages and disadvantages of the various peacekeeping 
options in light of a panoply of factors that may come to play in 
worst-case scenarios. 
As the authors have noted, there would not appear to be a 
definitive answer as to which peacekeeping model is best—in 
general or from an Israeli perspective. In certain situations, there 
would appear to be a clear preference for a UN-mandated 
peacekeeping mission, while other situations would seem better 
suited to non-UN-mandated multinational peacekeeping 
operations, and still other situations would appear best suited to 
bilateral peacekeeping without any foreign participation. Of 
course, the picture becomes more complex where more than one 
 
181. Interim Agreement, supra note 97, art. XVII. 
182. Chaim Levinson, IDF Arrests 35 Rightists Holed Up in Jericho Synagogue, HAARETZ 
(Tel Aviv), Feb. 23, 2010, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1151400.html. 
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factor comes into play. Real worst-case scenarios must take into 
account the possibility that all potential negative factors may have 
to be confronted, and it is such complexity that policy makers 
will have to face. 
While the assumption in various peace proposals to date has 
been that a peacekeeping force is an essential element, it would 
appear to the authors that this assumption is incorrect. While 
peacekeeping missions have proven successful in certain 
situations, they have failed in others. At the same time, it should 
be borne in mind that bilateral peacekeeping has shown itself to 
be effective along the Israeli-Jordanian border, and bilateral 
security cooperation with multinational oversight has succeeded 
along the Israeli-Egyptian border. Given the inherent limitations 
of peacekeeping in confronting spoilers, and the history of 
peacekeeping efforts to contend with spoilers in the region, it 
may well be that the common wisdom is mistaken, and that 
primarily bilateral security arrangements present the best course. 
That would seem to have been the course envisaged by the 
parties to the conflict in their negotiations and agreements up 
until now. The authors would suggest that it is one that should 
not be abandoned. 
